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ABSTRACT
LOGAN MATTHEW KOHAN: Delineating the Source and Implications of Social
Polarization
(Under the direction of Conor Dowling)

The purpose of this research was to examine the causes and consequences that
meta-perceptions of polarization in the United States entails. The survey used in this
study assessed respondents demographic and political information prior to questions
regarding polarization. This study found that the polarization in the United States results
from a multitude of variables, including: the intrusion of partisan cues into everyday life,
social sorting, polarization’s implicit effect, and differences in moral concern. Moreover,
polarization encompasses and variety of ramifications that include disease, amplified
interparty animosity, biased policy evaluation, reduced governmental efficiency,
intraparty polarization, tribalism, and the quest to achieve political victory rather than
achieving the “greater good.” In further discussion, it was determined that polarization
poses two main outcomes for the United States: a perpetual cycle in which polarization
continues to increase over time, or a future in which polarization has already reached its
apex and, thus, will deescalate over time. In light of these findings, it is prudent for
Americans to refrain from impulsivity to preclude the onset of polarization and its
accompanying repercussions.
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“Hatred, anger, and violence can destroy us: the politics of polarization is
dangerous” (Rahul Gandhi, 2017). Given the current condition of the sociopolitical
climate, the tension that exists between groups is not only more apparent than it has been
in recent decades, but it has also become tangible. For example, topics such as Black
Lives Matter, vaccination status, and - of course - the 2020 U.S. presidential election all
seem to elicit diametrically opposing factions of people. To understand the essence of this
discord, it is imperative to question its source; what causes this social incongruity?
Moreover, what has exacerbated this stark rift in American society? When pinpointing
the origin of this social phenomenon, one cannot help but recognize the role polarization
has in channeling this social tension. Political polarization refers to when subsections of a
population endorse, “increasingly dissimilar attitudes toward parties and party members
(i.e., affective polarization), as well as ideologies and policies (ideological polarization)”
(Heltzel and Laurin, 2020, p. 179). The polarization that can be observed today in the
United States is precipitated by a myriad of factors, which include the following: the
intrusion of partisan cues into everyday life (Iyengar and Westwood, 2014, p. 691), social
sorting (Mason, 2018, p. 54), the nuance of polarization’s implicit nature (Iyengar and
Westwood, 2014, p. 696), and differences in moral concerns (Graham et al., 2009, p.
1029). Moreover, the issue of polarization is one which should garner substantial concern
considering the momentous consequences it poses, such as disease (Nayak et al., 2021, p.
1), increases in interparty disdain (Iyengar and Westwood, 2014, p. 691), biased policy
evaluations (Ehret et al., 2018, p. 308), reduced governmental efficiency (Mason, 2018,
p. 47), intraparty polarization (Groenendyk et al., 2020, p. 1616), tribalism (Mason and
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Wronski, 2018, p. 274), and the quest to achieve political victory over achieving the
greater good (Tajfel et al., 1973, p. 172).
Existence of Polarization in the United States
To begin, it is imperative to first establish the existence of polarization – as well
as specify its societal manifestation – before its more abstract elements can be defined. A
study titled “Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization” examined the increase of
affective polarization, particularly in the United States. Affective polarization can be
defined as the “extent to which citizens feel more negatively toward other political parties
than their own” (Boxell et al., 2020, p. 2). The study utilized a feeling metric of average
partisan rated in-party members against out-party members. On a scale ranging from 0100, the difference between these two groups was 27.4 in 1978. This disparity grew to
56.3 in 2020, demonstrating a substantial increase in affective polarization. When
compared to 11 other countries, including Switzerland, France, Denmark, Canada, New
Zealand, Japan, Australia, Britain, Norway, Sweden, and (West) Germany, researchers
found that the United States demonstrated the largest increase in affective polarization
throughout the duration of this study (2). Therefore, the issue of polarization is most
evident in the United States and, thus, warrants closer inspection.
To further examine the distinctive polarization present in the United States, I
conducted a survey. This survey was administered through Lucid in March 2022 to more
than 2,000 respondents. The responses were collected from March 9-12, 2022. Human
subjects approval was obtained from the IRB at the University of Mississippi (Protocol
#22x-215). For this study, I obtained informed consent, basic demographic (e.g. gender,
race, education, income), and political (e.g. partisanship, ideology, voting behavior)
information prior to my questions related to polarization. My sample consisted of a fairly
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representative racial composition including about 74% White, 11% Black, 6% Hispanic,
5% Asian, and 4% other. The partisan make-up of my sample is roughly 52% Democrats,
38% Republicans, and 10% Independents.
Table 1: Respondent Demographic Characteristics
Sample characteristics (N = 2,168)
Average Age (in years)

47

% Female

55

Race
% white
% black
Average Income (10-point scale)
3 = $35,000-$49,999
4 = $50,000-$74,999
Average Partisanship (7-point scale)
1 = Strong Republican
4 = Independent
7 = Strong Democrat
Average Ideology (7-point scale)
1 = Extremely Conservative
4 = Moderate
7 = Extremely Liberal
Average Education (6-point scale)
1 = Some high school
6 = Postgraduate degree

74
11
3.9

4.4

3.9

3.7

I asked several questions of interest to this project. One question asked
respondents whether political polarization increased during the COVID-19 pandemic;
62.23% of respondents agreed that the COVID-19 pandemic escalated polarization, with
35.95% of all respondents being in strong agreement. Interestingly, the respondents who
3

identified with a party the strongest tended to agree the most: 35.66% of Strong
Republicans strongly agreed and 30.75% of Strong Republicans somewhat agreed;
42.44% of Strong Democrats were in strong agreeance with the survey question and
30.26% of Strong Democrats somewhat agree. Similarly, less fervent partisans exhibited
the same trend, though not quite to the same magnitude: 23.33% of Not very strong
Republicans strongly agreed and 29.17% somewhat agreed; 25.38% of Not very strong
Democrats strongly agreed and 32.95% somewhat agreed. A vast majority of those who
Lean Republican were in agreement with the survey question – 40.30% strongly agreeing
and 22.89% somewhat agreeing – as well as those who Lean Democrat – 38.12%
strongly agreeing and 24.86% somewhat agreeing. Though 43.07% of Independent
respondents indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that the
COVID-19 pandemic increased polarization, still, 22.85% strongly agreed and 23.97%
somewhat agreed. In essence, these results encapsulate not only the prevailing attitude
that the COVID-19 pandemic increased polarization, but it also highlights the correlation
between party identification and perceptions regarding polarization: the more fervent
partisans tended to be in stronger agreement that the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated
polarization
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Table 2: Partisan Demographic x Attitudes Regarding Polarization
Pid7
Strong
Republican
Not very
strong
Republican
Lean
Republican
Independent
Lean
Democrat
Not very
strong
Democrat
Strong
Democrat
Total

Strongly Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat Strongly
Agree
Agree
Agree/Disagree
Agree
Agree
32
37
109
163
189
29.09
26.24
16.62
22.61
21.77
10
17
87
70
56
9.09
12.06
13.26
9.71
6.45

Total
530
21.23
240
9.62

9
8.18
18
16.36
3
2.73
6
5.45

9
6.38
9
6.38
14
9.93
14
9.93

56
8.54
115
17.53
50
7.62
90
13.72

46
6.38
64
8.88
45
6.24
87
12.07

81
9.33
61
7.03
69
7.95
67
7.72

201
8.05
267
10.70
181
7.25
264
10.58

32
29.09
110
100.00

41
29.08
141
100.00

149
22.71
656
100.00

246
34.12
721
100.00

345
39.75
868
100.00

813
32.57
2,496
100.00

Perhaps one of the primary factors explaining these attitudes regarding
polarization stems from social media usage. To explain, the survey also assessed the
frequency of political content on social media viewed by the respondents. The study
found that a higher prevalence of political content viewed on these platforms correlated
with stronger attitudes concerning the increase in polarization during the COVID-19
pandemic: 51.18% of respondents who viewed political content on these platforms often
strongly agreed that polarization increased during the COVID-19 pandemic and 26.46%
somewhat agreed; 26.93% of those who reported viewing political content on these sites
only sometimes strongly agreed and 32.27% somewhat agreed; 22.47% of those who
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hardly ever view this kind of content on social media strongly agreed, 29.07% somewhat
agreed, and 37.44% neither agreed nor disagreed; 30.80% of those who never view
political content on social media strongly agreed, 18.00% somewhat agreed, and 43.20%
neither agreed nor disagreed. These results demonstrate the relationship between political
content consumed via social media and beliefs regarding polarization during the
pandemic: those who engaged with this type of content more frequently tended to have
stronger attitudes about polarization increasing.

Table 3: Frequency of Observed Political Content on Social Media x
Attitudes Regarding Polarization
COVID
Social Media Political Content
Polarization
Never
Hardly ever
Sometimes
Often
Total
Strongly
12
19
40
25
96
disagree
4.80
4.19
4.11
3.94
4.15
Somewhat
8
31
79
20
138
disagree
3.20
6.83
8.12
3.15
5.97
Neither
108
170
278
97
653
43.20
37.44
28.57
15.28
28.24
Somewhat
45
132
314
168
659
agree
18.00
29.07
32.27
26.46
28.50
Strongly
77
102
262
325
766
agree
30.80
22.47
26.93
51.18
33.13
Total
250
454
973
635
2,312
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

The study also examined social indications of polarization. Namely, the survey
asked whether respondents had stopped being friends with someone because of
something that person had said about government or politics. Discerning the extent of
discontinued friendships is insightful because it further represents the encroachment of
polarization into everyday life, particularly relationships. If a significant amount of
6

people report cutting ties with a former friend due to a mere difference in political
opinion, then this might be indicative of the sociological magnitude of polarization and
its repercussions. In keeping with the common theme here, more fervent partisans were
more likely to report that they had stopped being friends with someone: 26.79% of Strong
Republicans and 41.08% of Strong Democrats answered “yes”; 17.42% of Not very
strong Democrats and only 9.58% of Not very strong Republicans answered “yes”;
28.18% of Lean Democrats and 19.9% of Lean Republicans answered “yes”; 11.99% of
Independents answered “yes.”

Table 4: Partisan Demographic x Discontinued Friendship
Stop Being Friends
No
Yes
Total
Strong Republican
388
142
530
21.23
21.26
21.23
Not very strong
217
23
240
Republican
11.87
3.44
9.62
Lean Republican
161
40
201
8.81
5.99
8.05
Independent
235
32
267
12.86
4.79
10.70
Lean Democrat
130
51
181
7.11
7.63
7.25
Not very strong
218
46
264
Democrat
11.93
6.89
10.58
Strong Democrat
479
334
813
26.20
50.00
32.57
Total
1,828
668
2,496
100.00
100.00
100.00
Ostensibly, those who reported that they had, in fact, ceased being friends with
someone due to a political disagreement were also more likely to agree that polarization
escalated during the pandemic. 45.43% of people who answered “yes” strongly agreed,
7

28.30% somewhat agreed, and 12.63% neither agreed nor disagreed. On the other hand,
only 29.94% of those who answered “no” strongly agreed, 28.28% somewhat agreed, and
33.59% neither agreed nor disagreed. Comparing these sets of results reveals the
association between polarization and its social impact. Those who lost friendships due to
differences in political thought are more likely to support the notion regarding
polarization’s increase during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 5: Discontinued Friendship x Attitudes Regarding Polarization
Stop Being Friends
No
Yes
Total
Strongly disagree
73
40
113
3.69
5.81
4.24
Somewhat disagree
89
54
143
4.50
7.84
5.36
Neither
664
87
751
agree/disagree
33.59
12.63
28.17
Somewhat agree
559
195
754
28.28
28.30
28.28
Strongly agree
592
313
905
29.94
45.43
33.95
Total
1,977
689
2,666
100.00
100.00
100.00

As polarization continues to increase, so have Americans’ anxieties: 90%
consider the country to be politically divided and 60% are not entirely optimistic about its
current trajectory and whether or not these divisions will be resolved (Heltzel and Laurin,
2020, p. 179). Moreover, animus between parties has grown substantially: 80% of
Americans today disfavor opposing partisans, and the magnitude of people that fervently
hold this demeanor have tripled since 1994 (179). In fact, these revelations have
prompted many scholars to hypothesize that this interpartisan antipathy supersedes
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intrapartisan affinity and, furthermore, is the prevailing factor dominating the current
political landscape (179).
Factors Influencing Polarization
To fully understand the essence of polarization, it is imperative to delineate the
factors that help create it. In particular, there are six main factors that galvanize
polarization.
Intrusion of Partisan Cues
The scope of polarization is further evidenced by the intrusion of partisan cues
into everyday life. For instance, “a standard measure of social distance – parents’
displeasure over the prospects of their offspring marrying into a family with a different
party affiliation – shows startling increases in the United States, but not in Britain”
(Iyengar and Westwood, 2014, p. 691). Though it bears some relevance, the rarity that is
individuals marrying across party lines – only 9% of married couples – cannot be entirely
explained by parental dissatisfaction. In one study, marital selection on the basis of
partisanship eclipsed other relevant factors such as personality and physical attributes
(692). Ostensibly, “even though single men and women seeking companionship online
behave strategically and exclude political interests from their personal profiles, partisan
agreement nevertheless predicts reciprocal communication between men and women
seeking potential dates” (692). Partisanship is an integral component evinced in even the
most nonpolitical, mundane circumstances. Even the subtle nuances of courtship cannot
escape the expansive grasp of partisan discord.
Partisan Identification
The concept of partisan identification is especially relevant when delineating the
origins of polarization. In fact, most scholars attribute partisan affiliation as being the
9

most prominent indicator of an individual’s voting and political behavior in the United
States (Carmines et al., 2012, p. 1633). However, many researchers disagree about the
constancy of partisan identification: is it subject to change in response to evolving
circumstances, or is it resistant to these sociological pressures? One popular view on this
matter explains that partisan loyalty is a quality that is attained early in an individual’s
life, usually as a result of parental socialization. Partisan loyalty then endures throughout
one’s adult life, becoming an instrumental element in shaping the individual’s beliefs on
political matters and other issues (1634). Other scholars contend that partisan
identification is a mutable quality that reflectively changes and adjusts in response to
various political and social events (1634).
Recent survey data seem to corroborate this latter view. Using a 7-point ANES
partisan identification scale, these surveys found the average difference between liberals
and conservatives to be approximately 2.5 times more in 2008 than they were in 1972,
thus demonstrating the malleable nature of partisan identification at a collective level
(Carmines et al., 2012, p. 1637). Changes in partisanship at the individual level can be
observed in voters who adjust their political orientation in response to elite partisan
polarization.
Using two ANES surveys where respondents were re-interviewed 4 years apart,
we show that liberals and conservatives were more likely to become stronger
partisans, whereas libertarians and communitarians were more likely to adopt a
weaker partisan identification. Specifically, we consider two important periods:
1992-1996 and 2000-2004. The former period is important because the
Republican Party assumed control of both chambers of Congress simultaneously
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for the first time in over 40 years. Furthermore, the new members of the
Republican Party in Congress were considerably more conservative than the
moderate Democrats they replaced, thus considerably increasing the ideological
divide between the two parties in Congress (Carmines et al., 2012, p. 1639).
Elite party polarization serves to augment these attitudes, creating mass
partisanship and a “disappearing center” in the electorate (Abramowitz 2011). As parties
diverge, the difference in partisan favorability and the perceptions of difference between
parties simultaneously grows. Thus, the resurgence of partisanship is the result of
ideological polarization among party elites (Carmines et al., 2012, p. 1639).
The surveys also found that the stability and strength of partisanship is determined
by the consistency with which one’s attitudes coincides with the prevailing view of his or
her identifying party. The probability of libertarians and communitarians to change their
partisan identification were 38% and 44% respectively. Moderates are 32% likely to alter
their partisan identification. Compare this to the probabilities of liberals and
conservatives – which are 23% and 28%, respectively – and it becomes clear who is the
most severely impacted by partisan polarization. “Specifically, the closer the fit between
one’s own views on the major issues of the day and the menu of issue positions offered
by partisan elites, the more stable one’s partisanship and the more likely one becomes a
stronger partisan identifier over time” (Carmines et al., 2012, p. 1639).
Social Sorting
In addition, social sorting effectively reinforces these aforementioned party
passions by bolstering the identification individuals have with their respective party.
“Uncivil Agreement demonstrates that social sorting is capable of dividing partisans from
their political opponents by increasing intolerance of opposition” (Mason, 2018, p. 54).
11

Various theories in the field of social psychology suggest that this intolerance can be
predicted on the basis of asymmetry in the “social makeup” between opposing groups.
Though people typically hold a multifaceted set of personalities, “the most salient
identity tends to be the one whose status is threatened, or the one that is engaged in
conflict with an out-group” (55). Social psychologists consider people who share
overlapping identities to be aligned; the more closely aligned any two groups are results
in an enhanced level of disdain towards out-group members. When analyzing the
relationship between group alignment and tolerance, those who exhibited a high degree
of alignment within their respective social cohort tended to be less tolerant and more
prejudicial of outgroup individuals (55). Additionally, a study by Miller, Brewer, and
Arbuckle (2009) discovered that “perceived alignment between social groups predicted
both implicit and explicit racial prejudice, beyond the effects of ideology and
personality” (Mason, 2018, p. 55). In other words, if partisans perceive their social group
as homogenous, they will react with intolerance and prejudice towards partisan
outgroups. Likewise, if partisans consider their party to be diverse and inclusive of both
ingroup and outgroup members, those individuals will typically be more tolerant of
outsiders.
The Implicit Nature of Polarization
Furthermore, examining polarization at an intrinsic level may further clarify how
it precipitates. To elaborate, affective polarization on the basis of party is analogous to
that of racial polarization. Similar to racial discrimination, the impetus for inter-party
animus occurs at an implicit level. In fact, “The detection of implicit partisan affect
shows that the sense of partisan identity is deeply embedded in citizens’ minds,” and,
moreover, “[these] negative associations of opposing partisans are faster (more
12

automatic) than negative associations of African Americans” (Iyengar and Westwood,
2014, p. 696). This subconscious element of partisan animosity therefore signifies that
these attitudes are ingrained into individuals, and automatically manifest into the minds
of voters. Moreover, the degree of discrimination between opposing partisans is, in fact,
of a greater current magnitude than that of racial discrimination. “The willingness of
partisans to display open animus for opposing partisans can be attributed to the absence
of norms governing the expression of negative sentiment and that increased partisan
affect provides an incentive for elites to engage in confrontation rather than cooperation”
(690). Social norms serve to constrain and mold behaviors; however, unlike gender, race,
and other various social divides, “there are no corresponding pressures to temper
disapproval of political opponents'' (690). If anything, the actions and rhetoric that
politicians display encourage inter-partisan hostility. Thus, partisans feel vindicated in
openly expressing animus and discrimination towards outgroup members. “In the absence
of a social norm or sanction that discourages partisan discrimination, partisans frequently
choose to discriminate against opposing partisans” (691).
Differences in Moral Imperatives
In explaining the effectuation of polarization, it is imperative to understand that
liberals and conservatives are different at even the most fundamental level: moral
concern. There is some evidence that the issue of morality has been an area of non-selfinterested concerns that has garnered much attention in recent years. Political campaigns
spend considerable amounts of time and other resources towards appealing to voters’
self-interests, yet the relationship between rational self-interest and voting behavior
appears to be weak (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1029). Those who vote against their material
self-interest are considered to be voting on the basis of their values, which collectively
13

entail what they envision to be a “good society” (1029). However, the notion of what
constitutes a good society is not one that is universally shared. Effectively, these
conflicting visions have created a “culture war” within American politics. The “culture
war” refers to “a clash of visions about such fundamental moral issues as the authority of
parents, the sanctity of life and marriage, and the proper response to social inequalities”
(1029).
Traditionally, liberals have held a more optimistic perception on human proclivity
as well as the perfectibility of man, which Sowell (2002) deems as an “unconstrained
vision” in which people are left to their own accord in deciding appropriate courses of
action in aim of bringing about their own personal development. Conversely, the crux of
conservatism confers to a form of positional ideology, which is essentially a reaction to
the authority and institutions typically dominated by liberals. Historically, conservatives
are more pessimistic in their assessment of human nature, arguing that human endeavors
are inherently hedonistic and, moreover, that the human condition is imperfectable. These
opposing moral ideologies amount to what Sowell describes as a “constrained vision” in
which people require these constraints in order to live civilly with one another.
In addition to these conflicting visions, personalities also vastly diverge across the
political spectrum, where liberals tend to be more experimentative and pursuant of
change and conservatives gravitate towards familiarity, predictability, and stability
(Graham et al., 2009, p. 1030). On the other hand, conservatives tend to be more
emotionally susceptible to perceived threats to the social order, which is the predominant
motivation for their limiting of certain liberties for the purpose of preserving that order
(1030).
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In order to foment specific predictions regarding these moral differences, it is
imperative to examine the concept of the moral domain. Turiel (1985) defines the moral
domain as, “prescriptive judgements of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how
people ought to relate to each other” (3). When the issue of morality is likened to the
protection of individuals, the prevailing concerns are exterior to the moral domain.
Western elites are unusual in limiting the moral domain to [what they call] the
‘ethic of autonomy’ and, moreover, morality in most cultures also involves an
‘ethic of community’ (including moral goods such as obedience, duty,
interdependence, and the cohesiveness of groups and institutions) and an ‘ethic of
divinity’ (including moral goods such as purity, sanctity, and the suppression of
humanity’s baser, more carnal instincts) (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1030).
Recently, Haidt (2008) proposed an alternate definition to morality that includes
conservatives and non-Western concerns by analyzing the functions of a moral system
rather than just the content. “Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices,
institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or
regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (70). Moral systems attempt to restrain
these selfish inclinations by protecting individuals directly – via the legal system – and by
emphasizing the prudence of respect in relation to individuals’ rights. This individualized
approach shifts the central focus of moral values from the group – which is often
championed by binding approaches, which serve to emphasize the utility of social groups
in perturbing human nature and combating selfishness – to the individual. Though
political ideology is not confined to a narrow, one-dimensional spectrum, the

15

individualizing-binding distinction is useful in illuminating liberals and conservatives’
moral concerns, which underlie most culture war issues.
In further discussion, moral foundations theory refers to both the origination as
well as the variation in moral reasoning on the basis of inherent, standard foundations.
This concept is comprised of five basic elements, two of which are: The Fairness/
reciprocity foundation, which pertains to humans’ fixation on fairness, reciprocity, and
justice; and the Harm/ care foundation, which encompasses the human concern for
ensuring care, nurturing, and protection from harm for vulnerable individuals. These two
foundations can be conceptualized as the “ethic of justice” and the “ethic of care”
respectively and, furthermore, are the pillars of individualizing foundations because,
“they are the source of the intuitions that make the liberal philosophical tradition, with its
emphasis on the rights and welfare of individuals, so learnable and so compelling to so
many people” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1031).
However, it should be noted that the virtues of most cultures are not limited to
those that advocate for the protection of the individual. There exists a cluster of virtues –
three to be exact – that exist beyond the ethics of autonomy. The ethic of community is
comprised of “virtues of loyalty, patriotism, and self-sacrifice for the group, combined
with an extreme vigilance for traitors,” in addition to, “virtues of subordinates (e.g.,
obedience and respect for authority) paired with virtues of authorities (such as leadership
and protection)” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1031). And lastly, the ethic of divinity
encompasses, “virtues of purity and sanctity that serve social functions, including
marking off the group’s cultural boundaries and suppressing the selfishness often
associated with humanity’s carnal nature (e.g., lust, hunger, material greed) by cultivating
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a more spiritual mindset” (1031). These three foundations (Ingroup/ loyalty, Authority/
respect, and Purity/ sanctity) can be conceptualized as binding institutions because, “they
are the source of the intuitions that make conservative and religious moralities, with their
emphasis on group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control, so learnable and so compelling
to so many people” (1031).
The study by Graham et al. (2009) found that, when compared to liberals,
conservatives typically perceived issues regarding the Harm and Fairness criteria as less
relevant to their moral judgements. Instead, conservatives regarded the aspects of
Ingroup, Authority, and Purity as more germane to their moral judgment than did
liberals.
It may be inappropriate to perceive these opposing patterns of moral concern to be
a matter of more versus less rather than just different opinions about what considerations
are relevant to moral judgements. Furthermore, these differences were neither significant
nor consistently impacted by other metrics or variables (e.g., gender, age, income,
education level) thus indicating that these discrepancies were primarily a function of or
contributor to political identity (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1033).
Another integral concept in the discussion of moral judgment is the idea of moral
trade-offs. Moral trade-offs can be defined as, “any value that a moral community
explicitly or implicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that
precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular
values” (Tetlock et al., 2000, p. 853). It was found that liberals required slightly more
incentive to violate individualizing foundations – in particular, the Harm foundation –
whereas conservatives required significantly more incentive to violate the three binding
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foundations (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1037). Moreover, liberals were more reluctant to
violate their individualized moral foundations. “Liberal participants showed a greater
difference between the individualizing and binding moral foundations for their overall
degree of unwillingness to violate the foundations” (1037).
Furthermore, liberals generally assessed the consequences of moral rules at an
individual level, whereas conservatives were more likely to respect and abide by rules
given by a divine entity or figure – namely God, for religious conservatives – or from
preceding generations (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1037).
Moreover, the linguistic framing of messages is instrumental in painting certain
policies as either morally good or bad. Predictably, the results of Graham et al.’s study
found that liberals’ phraseology gave deference to notions regarding Harm and Fairness
whereas the rhetoric of conservatives appealed more so to the foundations of Ingroup,
Authority, and Purity.
The primary finding of the Graham et al. study is as follows:
Across all four studies, liberal morality was primarily concerned with Harm and
Fairness, whereas conservative moral concerns were distributed more evenly
across all five foundations. These findings help explain why liberals and
conservatives disagree on so many moral issues and often find it hard to
understand how an ethical person could hold the beliefs of the other side: Liberals
and conservatives base their moral values, judgements, and arguments on
different configurations of the five foundations (1040).
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In sum, understanding that liberals and conservative are at odds with one another
at a fundamental, moral level is crucial to understanding the stark polarization separating
the two groups.
Mediums Channeling Polarization
Now that its underlying elements have been divulged, it is crucial to analyze
potential mediums that channel affective polarization. Numerous studies have attributed
the growth in polarization evident in the United States to the simultaneous rise of digital
media and partisan cable news networks.
Within the domain of media influence, social media may even have a role in
contributing to the polarization seen today. Social media shapes polarization via the
mechanisms of partisan selection, message content, platform design and algorithms (Van
Bavel et al., 2021, p. 913). Though it is not necessarily the main driver to polarization,
social media is a key facilitator. However, there does seem to be much disagreement
amongst researchers about whether or not social media contributes to polarization. Some
believe social media enhances polarization by augmenting divisive partisan content,
which effectively confines people into echo chambers, encouraging intergroup conflict
(Brady et al., 2019, pp. 978-1010). Others disagree, stating that social media does not
have this impact (Boxell et al., 2017, pp. 10612-10617).
One point that is often overemphasized is that social media amplifies polarization
through its creation of political echo chambers. The amount of people who consume
markedly polarized content on these social media platforms is vastly outnumbered by the
amount of people who consume more centrist or even apolitical content (Van Bavel et al.,
2021, p. 913).
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Though papers such as Boxell’s (2017) conclude that social media is not likely to
be the primary factor in creating polarization – on the basis that older Americans are the
most polarized segment and they are not as likely to either use or be active on social
media – studies such as this one are overly reliant on observational data and fail to
account for the correlation of social media with user’s political beliefs (Van Bavel et al.,
2021, p. 914). In support, a recent study instructed participants to deactivate their
Facebook accounts 4 weeks prior to the 2018 U.S. election. The study found,
“Deactivating Facebook reduced issue (i.e., policy preferences) polarization and
marginally reduced affective (i.e., feelings about the other party) polarization, largely by
decreasing people’s exposure to news that facilitated a better understanding of their own
party relative to the other party” (913). Another field experiment had Republicans and
Democrats follow people with opposing political beliefs for 1 month on Twitter, finding
that exposure to members of an opposing party actually increased political polarization
(913). This backfire effect may be best explained by social media’s tendency to
selectively amplify extreme attitudes, and being exposed to these out-group hyperpartisans may cause individuals to become further entrenched in their beliefs.
Though the internet and social media posit a seemingly infinite amount of
information, this does not override people’s innate tendency to seek out information that
coincides with their presupposed political beliefs. “Research suggests that greater
selective exposure to congruent political news is correlated with (possibly being both
caused by and causing) polarization” (Van Bavel et al., 2021, p. 914). Additionally,
people will update their views more when that information corroborates their beliefs – a
concept referred to as asymmetric updating (914). People are also more willing to share
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content that aligns with them politically. Though these effects are primarily driven by the
user, it is worth noting the interaction between these cognitive biases with certain features
of the platform, which may amplify these effects. “Seeking out and engaging with
congruent information results in the platform’s algorithm exposing the individual to more
similar content” (914).
It is also vital to examine the content of messages on various platforms. More
divisive content is typically correlated with more engagement. For example,
An analysis of nearly 3 million social media posts found that posts about the
political outgroup (often reflecting outgroup animosity) were more likely to be
shared than those about the political ingroup. Each additional outgroup word (e.g.,
‘liberal’ or ‘Democrat’ for a Republican post) increased the odds of that post
being shared by 67% and increased the volume of ‘angry’ reactions on Facebook
(Van Bavel et al., 2021, p. 914).
Content dealing with moral outrage was also more likely to be disseminated and
the rhetoric of these messages generally portrayed outgroup members in a negative
manner.
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the prominence of divisive content is that it
captures our attention. Social media functions as an attention economy, in which users try
to go viral (Van Bavel et al., 2021, p. 914). Therefore, socially divisive content may be
conducive for message diffusion.
That said, polarization likely does not exist equally across all social media
platforms. In fact, a recent study in Israel found the rates of polarization on Twitter to be
significantly higher compared to Facebook and WhatsApp (Van Bavel et al., 2021, p.
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914). Additionally, these different social media platforms may contribute to different
forms of polarization. To explain, “Facebook algorithms may increase affective
polarization while Twitter has been linked to both affective and attitudinal polarization”
(914). These algorithms may even amplify content that support the user’s own social
identity and pre-existing beliefs. For instance, “Facebook’s newsfeed seems to
increasingly align content with cues about users’ political ideology (e.g., following
partisan news sources increases exposure to similar content)” (914). In sum, though
social media may not be the sole perpetrator, one cannot discount or overlook its
profound impact on facilitating political polarization for the mere purpose of content
consumption.
Collectively, the intrusion of partisan cues, partisan identification, social sorting,
the implicitness of polarization, differences in moral concern, and the mediums
facilitating dissemination all help facilitate polarization. Understanding how polarization
arises may also forecast its subsequent implications.
Current Implications
Do individual’s issue positions coincide with their level of affective polarization?
In a study titled “Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America”,
researchers found that partisans exhibiting high degrees of animus toward an opposing
party are more inclined to distinguish themselves from their political foes (Druckman et
al., 2020, p. 28). They achieve this by forming stances on new issues that juxtapose that
of the opposing party, aligning with that of their own party. It is apparent that animus is
the distinguishing factor given that, “as partisan animus increases, the partisan gap
emerges: when animus is low, partisans are indistinguishable from one another, but when
animus is high, partisans significantly diverge” (33).
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But if those who exhibit the most animus towards opposing partisans also tend to
have more extreme beliefs, then is it the animus that is driving those beliefs, the policy
beliefs driving animus, or can it be attributed to elite issue polarization that is
simultaneously driving these two elements? The COVID-19 pandemic may provide the
necessary conditions for this question to be answered. Data measuring affective
polarization among respondents was collected by researchers in the “Affective
polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America” study in 2019 – before the
onset of the pandemic – and, thus, provides a measure of affective polarization that is
exogenous to the COVID-19 pandemic. “We can examine how pre-existing levels of
partisan animus correlate with subsequent responses to COVID-19 without concern that
the responses to the pandemic are, in fact, shaping affective polarization (and, more
directly, out-party animus)” (Druckman et al., 2020, p. 28). In other words, the study’s
design eliminates the aforementioned variables that elites’ or individuals’ policy beliefs
drive affective polarization and, moreover, any relationship between beliefs and
polarization.
It is also important to consider the parties’ drastically different responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The difference in how partisan elites responded to the pandemic
indicates how affective polarization, particularly out-party animus, plays a vital role in
facilitating issue positions. Compared to their Republican counterparts, Democratic
politicians generally expressed greater concern about the pandemic and championed more
restrictive policies. It is especially notable when considering that the behavior of the two
parties in response to the pandemic were mirror opposites. This duality is relevant
because it implies that citizens have received specific information entailing how members
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of each partisan group ought to act, effectively elucidating elite cues (Druckman et al.,
2020, p. 30).
The results of the “Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in
America” study found that even in counties that had high numbers of COVID-19 cases,
Republicans and Democrats with high levels of animus differ in whether they engaged in
costly behaviors. This is due to the fact that Democrats exhibiting high rates of out-party
animus are already participating in various mitigating behaviors while Republicans with
high rates of out-party animus remain impervious to costly actions as case levels continue
to increase (Druckman et al., 2020, p. 35). These findings seem to broadly suggest that
policy differences between opposing parties are not merely derived from different
information, or different values, but also partisan animus.
Broader Implications
Paradoxically, though polarization tends to entail a more negative connotation,
polarization can actually be a benign tool conducive to cultivating a stable democracy.
The potential benefits of polarization are most evident in its effect on galvanizing civic
engagement. “Polarized citizens more often vote, protest, and join political movements,
all of which are necessary for functioning democracy and help disrupt undesirable status
quos” (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020, p. 179). Polarization can also be useful in that it
encompasses pluralistic policy alternatives. These alternatives are essential for
democracies, which require its citizens to engage in constructive discourse in order to
consider and evaluate multiple policies. Ideally, it is this type of engagement that
ultimately cultivates a government that is effective and stable: it allows societies to
identify pragmatic solutions that best resolve the most pressing issues while
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simultaneously ensuring that these policies will not be overturned by subsequent
administrations since they are mutually agreed-upon (179).
On the other hand, polarization can be a nefarious entity that obstructs democratic
processes. As Heltzel and Laurin write, “Highly polarized citizens often refuse to engage
with each other, reactively dismissing out of hand both potential flaws in their own views
and potential merits of their other opponents” (180). Effectively, under this particular
manifestation, constructive debates are unattainable and interpartisan mutuality becomes
elusive.
Moreover, contemporary polarization has a profound effect on social interactions.
“Americans accept smaller paychecks to avoid listening to opposing partisans, move to
new places to surround themselves with ideologically similar residents, and swipe left on
people with whom they disagree politically” (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020, p. 180).
Similarly, this effect of constrained social interaction deters Americans from critically
assessing the merits and defects of policies in an objective manner (180). Confirmation
bias and the utter disregard for information that may challenge presupposed beliefs are
emblematic of the pernicious risks that accompany polarization.
Aside from its metaphysical impact, polarization also seems to be physically
imposing. To explain, a study titled “Is divisive politics making Americans sick?
Associations of perceived partisan polarization with physical and mental outcomes
among adults in the U.S.” examined the potential health consequences inflicted by
extreme sociopolitical division. In particular, the study surveyed U.S. adults from
December of 2019 to January 2020 to gauge the correlation between perceived
polarization and the prevalence of hypertension, high cholesterol, diabetes, obesity,
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anxiety, depression and sleep disorders during or after the 2016 presidential election. The
study also calculated perceptions of mass and elite polarization at both the state and
national levels. To elaborate, perceived mass polarization refers to the perceptions of the
partisan gap between Republican and Democratic voters; on the other hand, perceived
elite polarization encompasses Democratic and Republican elected officials’ perception
of the partisan gap (Nayak et al., 2021, p. 1). The results showed that those participants
who reported an increase in polarization since the 2016 presidential election were
anywhere from 52%-57% more likely to report anxiety disorders and depression than
those who reported no change in polarization. It is evident from this finding that
perceptions regarding partisan polarization are associated with the manifestation of
various mental and physical disorders.
One must recognize that the crux of this study dealt with perceptions regarding
polarization because, “perceived polarization is often larger than actual polarization and
is frequently more strongly correlated with voting behaviors, attitudes toward
government, and feelings of partisan discord” (Nayak et al., 2021, p. 1). When
participants were inquired about the extent of the current political divide and whether or
not its impact has been amplified in response to the 2016 presidential election, the results
revealed that the perceptions of polarization were more rigid at the state level than they
were at the national level. This finding may be explained by the close “proximity of
seeing divisiveness in everyday interactions” (5). Thus, perceiving greater polarization at
the state level may be more detrimental to health than a perception that holds national
polarization to be more cumbersome.
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Equally important, political polarization in policy making is largely driven by the
partisan support it garners, rather than just the content of the policy itself (Ehret et al.,
2018, p. 308). To explain, the overwhelming influence of partisan cues on how people
evaluate certain policies can be so potent that it prompts individuals to prioritize party
over policy. This influence was demonstrated in an experiment where college students
evaluated welfare policies that were supported by either Democratic or Republican
officials (G.L. Cohen, 2003). The study found that though the participants were reading
the exact same policy, they reported differing stances, contingent on whether their own
party or the opposing party supported it (819).
Many critics of the party-over-policy effect contend that these results are only
significant within the confines of a laboratory setting, and, thus, not applicable to
everyday life. However, partisan cues are pragmatic in that they provide insight to
policies themselves. Since Democratic and Republican politicians generally support and
propose different policies, the use of partisan cues in assessing policies is commensurate
with the discernment of those different policies (Ehret et al., 2018, p. 308).
Additionally, these critics cite the relevance of other important factors in
formulating personal evaluations, such as policy knowledge or personal beliefs. They
argue that, essentially, the more knowledge someone has on a given topic, the less
impressionable and reliant they are on certain heuristic cues, like partisan framing (Ehret
et al., 2018, p. 309). In other words, proponents of this information-deficit theory suggest
that the more educated and informed individuals are, the better-equipped they are to
evaluate the policy’s content.
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In juxtaposition to this aforementioned concept, ideological-consistency theories
suggest that knowledge actually reinforces one’s reliance on partisan cues. In fact, as it
pertains to the divisive topic regarding climate change policy, “greater levels of
educational attainment did not lead individuals to adopt the scientific consensus
regarding climate change, but rather, more highly educated partisans aligned their climate
change beliefs with their political party, resulting in the greatest levels of polarization
among the most highly educated” (Ehret et al., 2018, p. 309).
Social norms that govern partisan behavior also serve to mediate the effects of
partisan identity and partisan cues on policy evaluation. An individual’s own support of a
given policy mirrors how strongly they perceive other fellow partisans to support or
reject that policy (Ehret et al., 2018, p. 309). Therefore, perceptions regarding how much
other ordinary members of their party support a policy (i.e., descriptive norms)
determines the individual’s own policy support. These descriptive norms are
psychologically compelling because they imply how individuals ought to evaluate a
policy in order to be considered good group members and not dissent from this status
quo. “In-group norms help partisans cohere around a uniform set of beliefs; out-group
norms provide a contrast to establish clear group boundaries” (309). In sum, in-group
norms (through the mechanisms of assimilation and conformity) as well as out-group
norms (through the facets of differentiation and opposition) further elucidate the impact
that partisan cues have on policy evaluation.
At the same time, perhaps policy evaluation is ancillary to the predominant
motivation underlying these dissenting opinions. An experiment that analyzed the
allocation of money between in-group and out-group members found that, “when people
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were given the chance to choose in-group victory over the greater good, even in the
presence of such weak and imaginary group labels, ‘it is the winning that seems more
important to them’” (Tajfel et al., 1973, p. 172). This study demonstrated the concept of
in-group bias, which is the implicit psychological tendency to perceive their in-groups
more favorably in order to maintain status. In-group bias stems from an innate propensity
to prefer us to them. People naturally resort to hostility toward outgroup members in the
presence of conflict. Such reactions exemplify the implicit nature of group membership,
and, moreover, serve to be representative of intergroup dynamics. The degree of hostility
Democrats and Republicans exude is contingent on the level of competition felt between
these two groups (Mason, 2018, p. 55). Thus, the greater the level of perceived
competition is, the more pronounced feelings of hostility become.
The desire to win rather than achieving the greater good is a consequence of a
strong social identity. “Where partisans once held cross-cutting identities that weakened
overall partisanship and allowed them to see their opponents as relatable, they now find
that their social identities lead them away from understanding those on the other side”
(Mason, 2018, p. 56). This lack of understanding is best typified by the willingness – or
lack thereof – of partisans to compromise with opposing partisans. Generally, partisans
uphold their stances and vehemently refuse to “give an inch to the other side” (Wolf et
al., 2012, p. 1689). Therefore, the emphasis on political victory encumbers amicability,
further fueling this polarized tension.
In sum, affective polarization is derived from the social construct of group
identity politics rather than genuine policy disagreements. As opposing parties evolve to
be more socially isolated from one another, the perception of politics as simply a matter
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of zero-sum competition – a view in which a political win for one party means a loss for
the other – proliferates the political landscape (Mason, 2018, p. 60). This type of thinking
dissuades political opponents from investing in the greater good, further deepening the
rift between Democrats and Republicans. As social divisions become more robust,
Democrats and Republicans begin to view each other more so as enemies rather than just
opponents. And the more entrenched these feelings of animosity become, the more that
personal identity is subjugated to partisan influence and discretion. Ultimately, the
essence of government will be neglected as American partisans fixate more on purely
winning.
The adversarial nature of modern-day politics poses many obstacles for
government to work efficiently. The source of this contentious environment emanates
from a lack of common ground between conflicting partisan groups. A lack of social
exposure between opposing partisan groups conjures feelings of intolerance, which, in
essence, causes individuals to dehumanize antagonistic partisan members (Mason, 2018,
p. 47). Though this sociopolitical discord may seem trivial and innocuous on its face, “the
basic understanding of partisan opponents as human beings with good intentions is not a
requirement of a democracy, but it is a requirement of a well-functioning one” (49). In
fact, in his 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington warned of partisan intolerance,
stating, “Partisanship agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms,
kindles the animosity of one part against another, forments occasionally riot and
insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a
facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions.”
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Ironically, public response to elite polarization has cultivated intraparty
polarization, which refers to, “increased dispersion in partisans’ feelings towards their
own party” (Groenendyk et al., 2020, p. 1616). To unpack this concept, it is imperative to
first examine how the public tends to respond to elite polarization.
First, many people respond by mirroring Congress’s lead. Though policy issues
may not be an area particularly impacted by polarization, the electorate has sorted,
nonetheless. This sorting has aligned the components of ideology and party identification
more strongly than they were before, instilling a prominent sense of social identity among
partisans. Furthermore, this alignment causes sorted partisans to become more involved
and resentful towards opposing partisans (Groenendyk et al., 2020, p. 1616).
Conversely, many people have grown tired of polarization. Distrust and
disengagement are common sentiments expressed by these people, blaming the boorish
nature of current political discourse for deterring them from politics altogether. Many
people are embarrassed to admit their political affiliation and even prevaricate, framing
their issue positions more moderately in order to “distance themselves from the partisan
fray” (Groenendyk et al., 2020, p. 1617).
So, has the division in the American populous resulted in more uniform groups, or
did they simply just divide? Despite feelings between partisans and their respective party
remaining relatively stable on average, simple spatial logic suggests increasing
homogeneity underscoring this average. Therefore, if ideological self-identification is a
necessary condition determining voters’ responses to elite polarization, then ideologically
extreme partisans should support their party’s growing extremity whereas moderate
partisans should oppose (Groenendyk et al., 2020, p. 1617).
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The study found, “While the average distance between Republicans and
Democrats' feelings toward one another has been growing (mean difference), there is
little evidence to suggest that partisans’ feelings are consolidating into more distinctive
groups (bimodality)” (Groenendyk et al., 2020, p. 1619). Rather, the more extreme
partisans are those impacted the most by affective polarization and this skews the mean
value for affective polarization. Fixating on the mean partisan may obscure
conglomeration in partisans’ response to elite polarization over the years. In fact, it
appears that the average partisan has grown to like their party less and less over time
(1620).
These aforementioned findings pose crucial implications for discerning the
current political landscape. Extant literature may suggest that the partisan divide will
continue to grow more rigid, however these results support the notion that this ideological
cleavage will actually grow to be more fluid. Parties are increasingly becoming more
divided from within regardless of ideological and partisan sorting (Groenendyk et al.,
2020, p. 1620). More fervent partisans will continue to gravitate and express support
toward their party, but more ideologically moderate identifiers increasingly favor their
party less, thus having nowhere to sort. A potential consequence of partisans becoming
devoid of political attachment is that it renders them more susceptible to third party and
antiestablishment influence, “increasing the likelihood of electoral realignment” (1620).
Identifying an Underlying Element in Polarization: Tribalism
Perhaps the best ontological explanation for polarization can be found when
examining it through a tribalistic lens. To begin, if an individual is technically affiliated
with a group that they do not necessarily feel particularly close to, then that identity will
have little effect on their behavior and beliefs. Conversely, strong connections to a social
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group enhances the salience of that particular identity (Mason and Wronski, 2018, p.
270). Therefore, those who are more closely attached to party-aligned groups (e.g.,
Whites, Christians, and Conservatives for Republicans, and Blacks, Hispanics, Atheists,
and Liberals for Democrats) will also exhibit stronger partisan identity, and vice versa.
Conversely, those who are strongly connected to groups that are not aligned with parties
(e.g., Blacks, Hispanics, Atheists, Liberal Republicans, or White, Christian, Conservative
Democrats) encounter cross-cutting pressures which should diminish party identity
strength. Party identity strength and partisan-aligned group attachment are strongly
correlated, albeit asymmetrically across the two parties. For Democrats, as connection to
aligned religious, racial, and ideological groups increases, partisan identification is
enhanced. This association is more pronounced among Republicans, “with increases in
group attachment relating to an increase in party strength by nearly two-thirds'' (270).
Intuitively, this incongruity makes sense. “The Democratic Party encompasses a greater
variety of groups, making cross-cutting identities less detrimental to Democrats’ party
identity, relative to Republicans who have fewer associated groups and more identitybased ‘deal-breakers’” (270).
As it pertains to social sorting, individuals that demonstrate stronger objective
sorting should also exhibit an increased affinity for their party. This study found that,
once again, Republicans exhibited a more pronounced association between objective
sorting and in-party feelings (Mason and Wronski, 2018, p. 271). Regardless of the
analogous relationships between in-party ratings and objective sorting across the two
parties, Democrats tended to feel more positively about their party despite their degree of
objective sorting (271). This disparity between partisan groups is most prevalent among
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the least objectively sorted, “where Democrats holding the most cross-cutting identities in
both samples remain relatively affectionate toward their co-partisans” (272). On the
contrary, Republicans who are strongly attached to the religious, racial, and ideological
groups who are not aligned with the party tended to respond more negatively towards the
Republican Party. “Yet, Republicans who feel close to the ‘correct’ party-aligned groups
are just as warm towards their co-partisans as Democrats” (272). Thus, Republicans,
generally speaking, tend to be more conscious of who does and does not “belong” in the
group. Republicans who perceive themselves as “outsiders” – whether that is due to a
difference in racial, religious, or ideological values – feel less attached to their party than
Democrats who do not feel like they fit in (273).
When it comes to social-group membership and party identification, social
identities function as integral components that determine the strength of partisan
attachment. Objective and subjective forms of social sorting, collectively and
individually, enhance ingroup partisan identification (Mason and Wronski, 2018, p. 273).
One of the most significant implications of these findings is that partisanship is
unequivocally associated with individual-level understanding of party-group alliances
(subjective sorting), and cognitive proximity to the aligned groups (objective sorting).
“The cumulative effects of party-group alignment reveal a psychologically durable
partisan social identity that can be singular in nature – in essence, a tribe that binds all
other identities together” (274).
It is interesting to consider that within the typical coverage of “identity politics,”
it is the Democratic Party that is typically associated with using social identities as a
means for political gain. However, Mason and Wronski’s work suggests that Republicans
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are the most sensitive to the alignment of their party-associated groups (Mason and
Wronski, 2018, p. 274). In fact, the most cross-cutting identities are more deleterious to
in-party loyalty for Republicans than they are for Democrats (274). Grossman and
Hopkins (2016) characterize Democrats as the party of group interests, whereas the
Republicans are the party of “ideological purity.” This Republican “purity” refers to inparty social uniformity. Republicans that do not fit the White, Christian stereotype are far
less associated with the Republican Party than those who do fit this mold. This effect is
more pronounced among Republicans than it is among Democrats, who encompass a
substantially larger variety of racial and religious backgrounds that do not coincide with
the mold of the average Democrat. Considering that Republicans are typically linked with
fewer associated social groups, “deal-breaker” identities is a concept that is more
applicable to Republicans than Democrats. Given this, Republicans are more dependent
than Democrats on their social identities for establishing fervent partisan attachment and
having a more cohesive ideological framework (Mason and Wronski, 2018, p. 274).
One crucial implication from these results is the notion that political elites may
wield varying incentives to remind voters about the different groups that constitute each
partisan team, thereby cajoling them into the preferred, “correct” behavior. Specifically,
the Republican Party, being the less diverse and socially sophisticated of the two parties,
could easily reemphasize voters’ White and Christian identities to bolster partisan
identity strength. In contrast, it would be pragmatic for Democratic leaders to remind
voters of their accomplishments on behalf of various, diverse groups.
All partisans, however, are incentivized to portray the other party as social
strangers, making the in-party ever more attractive…as social identities are
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increasingly associated with one party or the other, and as partisans increasingly
identify with these party-associated groups, the American divide grows more
intractable…the convergence of social identities along partisan lines makes inparty preference more powerful and out-party preference more powerful and outparty tolerance ever more difficult (Mason and Wronski, 2018, p. 274).
In further discussion on the element of tribalism, coalitional conflict is a
foundational element of the human mind. Competition is ubiquitous and is a driving
factor between human tribes for thousands of years. Cooperation and cohesion to these
coalitions were conducive not just for survival, but also for acquiring land and other
resources. Defectors were punished or publically vilified and loyal members were
rewarded handsomely with resources or status, elucidating the value tribes assign to
coordination and commitment in achieving group success. Therefore, individual-level
fitness could be improved by demonstrations of commitment and loyalty to the tribe and
its members. Effectively, this practice “selects for traits that signal and enhance
coalitional commitment” (Clark et al., 2019, p. 587). Therefore, tribalism is natural.
Despite the fact that tribal loyalties can motivate many benevolent actions, they
can also deter individuals from sound reasoning and accuracy in favor of group
belonging. That is, tribal loyalty precipitates tribal biases. To elaborate, people select
information that adheres to their tribe’s guiding principles, while actively dismissing
information that conflicts with it. This approach to information generates a biased
assessment, where information in support of the tribe’s agenda is blindly accepted and
any information that counters it is received skeptically (Clark et al., 2019, p. 587).
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So, why does tribalism distort beliefs? To begin, beliefs are emblematic of loyalty
to group goals. At some level, stated beliefs are representative of behavioral intentions
and, further, of coalitional membership. If beliefs are held ardently, elicit a strong
emotional response, or are costly to bear, they may signal as genuine loyalty indicators.
Unfortunately, dogmatism and the rejection of dissenting evidence accentuates the
signal’s appeal because they demonstrate one’s devout commitment to the group’s
ideology despite potential ramifications (Clark et al., 2019, p. 588).
Additionally, beliefs function as precursors, forecasting the potential arguments
that align with the group’s interests, “which coalitions are often formed to pursue and
protect” (Clark et al., 2019, p. 588). Since modern society does not typically condone
violence, tribes prevail by persuading other people, through the mechanism of
argumentation, rather than physically conquering another tribe. Thus, the primary
motivation for people favoring information that champions their group’s interests and
rejecting information contrary to these interests is to brand themselves more persuasively
on behalf of their group’s cause.
These two reasons explaining why tribalism alters beliefs may also help to explain
why the political landscape is an area that is especially entrenched in bias. Political
contests pose monumental implications because they entail the ways in which coveted
resources (power, wealth, status) are to be allocated and distributed amongst society.
Control of governmental mechanisms and cultural narratives are awarded to the political
victors, advancing their coalition at the expense of the losers. Given these lofty
implications, catalysts to ignite group loyalty and uphold the group’s stances are
especially powerful within the political domain (Clark et al., 2019, p. 588).
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As it pertains to the political realm, bias is most prominent in issues that resonate
the most with their group, often involving moral commitments. As mentioned earlier,
moral commitments signify one’s willingness to conform to the coalition’s rules.
Consequently, those who adhere and express support for those prescribed moral norms
are often given status by the group. Conversely, those who rebel or oppose these norms
have their status reduced by the group (Clark et al., 2019, p. 588). Therefore, one can
anticipate these biases to be particularly salient for important moral commitments.
The quest for truth and accuracy is also a primary concern for humans, so biases
are most likely to be present in issues where the truth appears to be ambiguous. In fact,
most political and moral contention are derived from ambiguous affairs. Even if there
were an expert consensus on the facts of the matter, “political positions often reflect
opinions about what ought to be the case (often subjective beliefs) based on beliefs about
what is the case (ideally objective facts)” (Clark et al., 2019, p. 588). In these instances
where the truth is ambiguous, tribal biases are salient because argumentation prevails
when the truth is not apparent or easily discernible. One may expect ambiguity to incite
humility and admissions of ambivalence, but when ambiguity arises in instances of
coalitional conflict, it actually enhances bias. This makes sense considering that humans
are coalitional creatures, rather than dispassionate agents of reasons. “They were not
‘designed’ to be humble; rather, they were ‘designed’ to conform and to protect the status
of their tribe” (588).
Thus, in sum, the guiding principle here is that tribal bias is an integral component
of human nature and this very element is ineradicable in its essence, effectuating
predictable cognitive biases (Clark et al., 2019, p. 591). But more importantly, if
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polarization is a symptom of something which occurs naturally – tribalism – then, by
extension, is polarization also natural?
The Consequential Trajectories for America
So, what does this mean for America’s future? I argue that there are two main
possibilities. The first possibility is that polarization is a perpetual cycle that will only
continue to increase over time. This self-reinforcing cycle can be attributed to
Americans’ overperceptions regarding polarization that causes them to reactively
disassociate from opposing partisans, thereby fueling actual polarization. As Heltzel and
Laurin find, “Americans overestimate the extremity of both their opponents and copartisans’ views, to the point where they perceive partisan opinion gaps to be twice their
true size” (180).
These overestimates may be directly influenced by three sources. The bias in
polling may incite polarization through the divisive language of the polls themselves. For
instance, the term opposing parties generally garnered more polarized attitudes amongst
Republicans as opposed to the term the Democratic Party (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020, p.
180). Secondly, the pervasive coverage of “extremists” is another contributing factor –
though these people amount to fewer than 10% of all Americans. “News stories cover
their views more often, they are twice as likely to post about politics on social media, and
because they use negative, angry language to morally condemn opponents, their
messages are more likely to spread through social networks” (180). This type of
selectivity may skew people’s views regarding the modal perceptions of each party.
Lastly, the pessimism of mainstream political content is psychologically imposing.
“Negative political content (e.g., stories of disrespect and closed-mindedness, distressing
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poll results, extremists’ messages) grabs attention, dwells in memory, and colors our
impressions of politics more than equally positive content” (180).
Another possible future is one in which polarization is analogous to a pendulum
that has reached its apex. This deescalation may emanate from society’s own vexation for
polarization and its ramifications. Their contempt has increased for two primary reasons.
First, polarization engenders extremist policy alternatives, which most people regard
unfavorably even when the source is that of their own party (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020, p.
181). Secondly, Americans rebuke polarization’s consequences.
They feel that the quality of political discussion has deteriorated, featuring
too many insults and not enough factual debate, and they are embarrassed about
their current politicians’ antagonistic behavior…rather than applauding party
representatives who berate opponents, they prefer civil, respectful political
relations. Likewise, they believe political closed-mindedness is unintelligent and
morally wrong, and reject co-partisans who refuse to consider opposing views,
even socially excluding these dogmatic co-partisans (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020, p.
181).
The disrespectful and closed-minded attitudes that polarization conjures causes a
rebound effect, in which people detach from their respective parties, thus weakening
polarization. “For example, upon seeing co-partisans disrespect opponents and ignore
their views, Americans disidentify with their parties, instead moving toward more
moderate positions” (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020, p. 181).

40

In examining our current polarized state, one is reminded of America’s first
president, George Washington. When faced with pressing issues at the time, Washington
would welcome discourse from Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, representing
opposing viewpoints. Washington would then form his assessment of the matter at hand
through a synthesis of these ideas. In the same vein, Americans should also strive to
emulate this stoicism when facing divisive issues. The truth is often forged from the
crucible derived from a culmination of viewpoints. As the renowned American author
Kurt Vonnegut said, “If you are an American, you must allow all ideas to circulate freely
in your community, not merely your own.”
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Appendix A
Survey Questions
The language of the questions for my survey were as follows:
•

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a
Republican, an Independent, or something else?
-

Response choices: Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other

{If Independent}
•

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party, closer to the
Republican Party, or equally close to both parties?
-

Response choices: Closer to the Democratic Party, Closer to the Republican
Party, Equally close to both parties

{If Democrat}
•

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
-

Response choices: Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat

{If Republican}
•

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
-

•

Response choices: Strong Republican, Not very strong Republican

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: During the COVID-19
Pandemic political polarization has increased.
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-

Response choices: Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither, Somewhat
agree, Strongly agree

•

How frequently is the content you view on these platforms about politics?
-

•

Response choices: Never, Hardly ever, Sometimes, Often

Have you ever stopped being friends with someone because of something they
said about government or politics?
-

Response choices: No, Yes
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